Analyzing the International Criminal Court Complementarity
Principle Through a Federal Courts Lens
Introduction
The signing of the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court
(ICC) was viewed by many in the international law community as a constitutional
moment not unlike the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 In giving birth to a new
type of legal institution, the Rome Statute created a void in the ability of any existing
body of law to precisely convey the nature of the ICC. The Court is neither in a direct
vertical nor horizontal relationship to State courts, with the result that traditional
international or national legal norms do not apply.2 The federal courts in relation to state
courts initially encountered much the same problems that the ICC is encountering in
relation to national courts because the federal court system provided an entirely new way
of imagining the American legal structure.3 Although the comparison is not perfect, the
similarities in the situations render the doctrines of federal courts law highly relevant to a
study of the manner in which the ICC can interact with States.4 Federal courts law
contains a wealth of doctrines such as exhaustion and abstention that are useful both for
explaining ICC deference to State proceedings, a regime known as complementarity, and
how or when the ICC can or should deviate from that initial deference.
Background
The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into existence as a result of a
multilateral convention, known as the Rome Statute, that was signed on July 17, 1998.
The Rome Statute was voted into effect by 120 States and the Court was born on July 1,
2002. With almost a hundred ratifications, the Court is now in its third year of existence.
The Court consists of the Presidency, Chambers, in which the judges sit, the Office of the
Prosecutor, which is responsible for receiving referrals, and conducting investigations
and prosecutions, and the Registry, which is responsible for non-judicial aspects of the
administration of the Court. In the greater context, the ICC is the first court of its kind. It
is a permanent criminal court whose nearest relatives are the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
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(ICTR), both of which, however, are UN bodies that have limited geographical and
temporal jurisdiction.5
After a heated negotiation process in which the interests of sovereign States and
human rights groups and other NGOs clashed over the intended strength of the Court, the
Rome Statute bestowed upon the ICC a complementarity regime that gives States the
primary claim to conduct proceedings in cases which might otherwise qualify for ICC
jurisdiction.6 This idea is embodied in paragraph 10 of the Rome Statute’s Preamble as
the idea “that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Unlike the ICTY and ICTR charters
which give those courts primacy over any national proceedings,7 the ICC is meant to be
secondary and only provide a forum when the State proceedings fail. For this purpose,
the Court under Article 17 retains the ability to initiate investigations and prosecutions if,
and only if, it is able to show that the State is either not taking any action or that the State
is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” The idea
is that, “[i]n exercising its jurisdiction, the Court will be acting as an extension of the
territorial and national criminal jurisdiction available to States Parties; by limiting such
exercise to where States are unable or unwilling, the Statute shows that the Court is not
also an extension of States Parties’ national criminal justice systems. It does not replace
or supplant national jurisdictions.”8 Crucial to this regime is the consent of the States
who, through their signatures, “recognize the Court’s jurisdiction over all the crimes
within its jurisdiction.”9 The foundation of the Court’s jurisdiction is State consent and it
acts only as an extension of the national systems when the States are incapable, not as an
appellate court.10
To this end, the Court has a very specific realm in which it is designed to
function. The ICC has only subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes listed and defined
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within the statute itself – namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.11
Additionally, the Court is limited to crimes committed after the enactment of the
Statute,12 and the Court’s jurisdiction can only be exercised via one of three ways:
referral by a State Party, referral by the Security Council, or the Prosecutor may initiate
an investigation based on his proprio motu power.13
Although complementarity is typically deemed a safeguard for national
sovereignty, it actually encompasses a dual capacity. From a simple viewpoint,
complementarity allows the Court to defer to national judiciaries and prevents the Court
from taking jurisdiction away from States.14 The interface of ICC and national
jurisdiction, however, also creates an area of expansion for ICC jurisdictional reach by
allowing the Court itself to review and assess national judiciaries. The tension between
the Court’s twofold mandate to practice both restraint and autonomy again recalls the
federal court system’s need to manage state court independence while maintaining the
supremacy of federal law and the Constitution.
The ICC in its incipient stages of development thus faces the challenge of
delineating limitations and standards for its process of admitting cases. Just as the
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison reserved to itself the ability to determine its own
jurisdiction,15 so the Rome Statute charges the ICC with the task of determining the
extent of its own jurisdiction.16 As part of its task, the Court must make determinations
on admissibility requirements, a task which begins with the guidelines prescribed by the
Rome Statute. Although the word complementarity is not used in the Rome Statute, the
idea is embodied in several parts of the treaty. For example, the Preamble states that the
ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”17 The crux of the
complementarity scheme, however, lies in Articles 17 which addresses admissibility. In
short form, Article 17 requires the Court to consider a case inadmissible when (a) a State
is already investigating or prosecuting, (b) the State has already investigated and decided
not to prosecute, (c) the accused has already been tried or (d) the case is not of sufficient
gravity. A case is admissible, however, if the Prosecutor can prove that any of the
preceding scenarios resulted from the State’s “unwillingness” or “inability” to
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“genuinely” prosecute. The unwillingness factor is evaluated on the basis of whether the
national proceedings were designed to shield the accused or constituted an unjustified
delay inconsistent with bringing the accused to justice. Inability, meanwhile, is
determined on the basis of whether “due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability
of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”18
The complexities of the ICC’s complementarity scheme are best explored through
a hypothetical extrapolation of the Security Council’s recent referral of the Darfur
situation in Sudan according to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.19 Unlike the Court’s
current investigations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo and its most
recent referrals for Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic, all of which are
signatories of the Rome Statute and which were referred by the States themselves under
Article 13(a), Sudan is not a signatory of the Rome Statute. Prior to the Security Council
referral, the ICC Prosecutor was thus not able to contemplate an investigation of the
Darfur situation. Sudan has responded vehemently that the ICC has no jurisdiction over
its citizens and that it will not cooperate with the ICC in any pursuant investigation.20
Ignoring for now the inevitable enforcement and cooperation issues which would
arise with the advent of an ICC investigation of a non-cooperative State, the more
pressing question raised by the Darfur situation is how the Court addresses the issue of
admissibility. Because the previous referrals have come from the States themselves,
amounting to a waiver of the admissibility requirement,21 the Court has never actually
addressed admissibility. The exceptions to complementarity seem theoretically simple
enough – mere proof of unwillingness or inability – but when faced with Darfur, a
situation in which the national government and judiciary is actually intact and unwilling
to cede to ICC jurisdiction, forging ahead freely with a claimed right to review and
prosecute does not seem that simple.
The first scenario for Darfur is the no-man’s land state of affairs such as existed
before the Sudanese government created the Darfur Special Criminal Court, a three-judge
traveling court, in June 2005. Prior to that time, the Sudanese government had not
opened a formal investigation into the situation in Darfur, although all parties were
doubtless aware of the numerous atrocities which had been committed. The Khartoum
regime, despite the international outcry over its handling of Darfur, continually made
reassurances to the international community that it was properly managing the situation
without actually committing to anything.22 The Prosecutor, meanwhile, must act on the
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referral handed down by the Security Council.23 Article 53 bestows the Prosecutor with
discretion to dismiss the situation, listing several factors that may form the basis of
dismissal, including admissibility under Article 17.24 On a practical level, even a
Security Council referral will not abolish the Prosecutor’s need to evaluate the
admissibility of a case either before or after an investigation begins.
According to the Court’s own guidelines, in the absence of any current or past
State action on the matter, the ICC faces no impediment to commencing an
investigation.25 The Court presumes that if it has an interest in beginning an investigation
and a State is lodged in an “inaction” stage, admissibility is not an issue that necessitates
debate because inaction equates to clear admissibility.26 This stance on the inaction
scenario is noticeably stronger than the words used in Article 17 and elsewhere in the
Rome Statute. For example, Article 17(1) utilizes a double negative type of structure to
state that a case is inadmissible unless the elements of unwilling or unable are present.
The presumption underlying complementarity is deference to national prosecution unless
the State shows itself to be ill-equipped. An interpretation of the Court’s stance
regarding complete State inaction may be that inaction is the most severe type of
unwillingness which merits omission of the admissibility determination.
A slightly different scenario is envisioned under Article 17(1)(b). For a case in
which the State has already conducted an investigation and decided not to prosecute, the
ICC must cede and consider the case inadmissible unless the decision not to move
forward was spurred by the State’s unwillingness or inability.27 Although inadmissibility
is not as easily waived for this situation, the inaction of the State will still lead to an
assumption of admissibility by the Court in the absence of ongoing proceedings, or else
an evaluation of the State’s willingness or ability which will likely spur the State into the
next scenario discussed below. In either case, for practical purposes inaction and a
decision to not prosecute will be approached in the same way by the Court.
Darfur in this first scenario in which it has either no history of an investigation or
prosecution or no intention of commencing proceedings, thus creates very little clash
between ICC and national jurisdiction since only one jurisdiction – that of the Court – is
being asserted. Realistically, this stage will almost never persist unless the State, for
23
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some political reason, secretly desired the ICC intervention and proceeds to cooperate
with the ICC.28 Otherwise, the inaction stage seems inextricably tied to a negative
response on the part of the State whose jurisdiction has been questioned.
The State’s reaction to the ICC intention to investigate leads to the second
scenario which is the current situation. The Sudanese government followed through with
its statements and began its own national proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of
crimes punishable under the Rome Statute. Because the Darfur referral came via the
Security Council, the Court’s response follows different rules than for a State Party
referral or an exercise of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.29 According to Article
19 of the Statute, Sudan is allowed to challenge the admissibility of the case to the ICC,
which it presumably would do if it were conducting its own proceedings. Article 19
makes no specific requirement upon the Prosecutor to defer to the State investigation,
which means this second scenario branches into two paths: 1) the Prosecutor defers to the
State in much the same manner as he would under Article 18,30 or 2) he prepares to make
the case that the Sudanese government is conducting proceedings that qualify Sudan as
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”31 If the
Court chooses to defer to Sudan, it can neatly follow many of the doctrines which define
the basis of federal courts law. But if the Court, after taking stock of Sudan’s
proceedings and determining that they do not meet Rome Statute standards, decides to
remove the investigation or prosecution to the ICC, it can utilize some of the exceptions
to the doctrines to define its boundaries and explain its determinations.
The first option most closely achieves the goal of promoting national prosecutions
and follows the path of least resistance by deferring to national proceedings. The Court,
by deferring to the State, supports the presumption that the State has the primary or
dominant claim to jurisdiction.32 This tension between ICC and national jurisdiction is
almost identical to a cornerstone of American federal courts law – the tension between
federal and state power. Federal courts as created under Article III of the Constitution
were designed to implement the powers of the national government and provide a
uniform interpretation of the Constitution and federal laws.33 The basic premise of the
28
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federal court system – that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that state
courts are courts of general jurisdiction – cedes only a parcel of jurisdiction to the federal
courts,34 a setup analogous to the way in which the ICC only maintains “concurrent”
jurisdiction over a narrow segment of a State’s law.35 Federal courts over the years have
had to work around the initial limitations, resulting in a body of prescriptions federal
courts use to restrain themselves which may provide good theoretical underpinnings to
future ICC decisions.
Exhaustion of State Remedies Prior to Federal Habeas
One such doctrine federal courts follow in deferring to state jurisdiction is
exhaustion of state remedies. On a practical level, without requiring exhaustion of state
remedies, federal courts would not be able to handle the volume of cases which would
flood its circuits36 and state court proceedings might face unduly delays and interference
as parties invoked federal proceedings.37 More importantly, however, the state
exhaustion requirement embodies a conscious effort to defer to states as legitimate and
equal seats of jurisdiction.38 By deferring to national proceedings, the ICC can invoke
this tradition of exhausting state remedies.
Federal habeas review is the most well-known residence of the exhaustion
requirement. The doctrine was codified in 28 U.S. C. §2254(b), but the presumption that
state remedies should be exhausted existed even before then.39 Exhaustion seeks to
preserve the delicate balance between federal and state powers in order to better protect
both federal and state institutions. In part,
Exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application and
enforcement of federal law. Early federal intervention in state criminal
proceedings would tend to remove federal questions from the state courts,
isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their
understanding of and hospitality to federally protected interests. Second,
34
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exhaustion preserves orderly administration of state judicial business,
preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal habeas
proceedings. It is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts,
which can develop and correct errors of state and federal law and most
effectively supervise and impose uniformity on trial courts.40
Of these reasons, the first is particularly relevant to the ICC because of the Court’s small
capacity and its reliance on the continued goodwill of the international community. The
ICC is a court of last resort not equipped to handle more than a few selected cases at a
time.41 Additionally, the Court will fare better in gaining cooperation for a subsequent
ICC proceeding if it protects the State’s proceedings as much as possible.42 The ICC
equivalent of the “federally protected interests” is the interest in protecting State resolve
to prosecute the crimes under the Rome Statute.43 If made to feel like an inadequate
forum, a State may not work as hard to show its own capability, thereby defeating the
Court’s purpose of encouraging States to bring perpetrators to justice.44 In the case of
Sudan, the Security Council referral has put the spotlight on the country and if the ICC
were to defer to national proceedings, Sudan would know that its every action was being
scrutinized. In order to avoid further breach of international relations or sanctions, Sudan
would most likely attempt to conducts its proceedings in accordance with some minimum
standard of “being conducted independently or impartially” consistent with “an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice.”45
This then integrates the second reason for the exhaustion requirement, that of
letting the state “develop and correct errors of state and federal law.” Under the system
of complementarity, the ICC has a secondary mandate of developing State interpretations
and applications of the Rome Statute. When the Court watches and reviews the
proceedings of national jurisdictions in order to determine the constitution of acceptable
proceedings that avoid the ICC’s reach, it is in fact propounding a set of guidelines for
national laws and proceedings.46 The Court and States may engage in a system of trial
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and error, but States will eventually come to mold their national laws according to the
ICC body of law.47 The wonder of the exhaustion process is that it does not require the
ICC to brandish its authority in order to achieve integration of Rome Statute components
into the national law – the Court can stay on the sidelines while the national courts feel
the burden of the Court’s watchful eye exhorting the State to do its best.
Related to the development of nationals laws is one of the most fundamental
issues the ICC faces within the complementarity scheme – the lack of any required
implementing legislation on the part of the signatory States. The Rome Statute would
have faced a wave of resistance if it had pushed through with a requirement that all State
Parties implement the Statute’s substantive law.48 Although the Statute does impose an
obligation on States to cooperate under Part 9, that duty does not extend to legislation
incorporating the crimes.49 The resulting gap between the Rome Statute and national
laws is a potential complication for any review of national proceedings purporting to
determine ability, willingness and genuineness. Utilizing national domestic laws, what
can be called the “ordinary crimes approach,” a State with good intentions could fulfill its
role according to admissibility requirements without charging for the same crimes as the
Rome Statute.50
For example, if the Sudanese government investigated and/or prosecuted several
individuals for murder or rape (encompassed in the atrocities alleged in Darfur) according
to their national laws as “ordinary crimes,” the ICC could not automatically determine
that the national proceedings were insufficient because they did not prosecute the
defendants for genocide or crimes against humanity. Under a vertical application of the
doctrine of ne bis in idem, a relative of the American double jeopardy doctrine, spelled
out in Article 20, the Court must not prosecute a person already tried by another court for
the same conduct, even if the charge was for an “ordinary crime.”51 Only on a showing
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supra note 25, at 8 (“It was extremely important to many States that proceedings cannot be found ‘nongenuine’ simply because of a comparative lack of resources or because of a lack of full compliance with all
human rights standards. The issue is whether the proceedings are so inadequate that they cannot be
considered ‘genuine’ proceedings. Of course, although the ICC is not a ‘human rights court,’ human rights
standards may still be of relevance and utility in assessing whether the proceedings are carried out
genuinely.”).
51
See Christine Van den Wyngaert and Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of
Amnesty, in Cassese et al, eds., supra note 7, at 724-25; Leila Sadat, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 190
(2002); Schabas, supra note 5, at 88. But see Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 91
(pointing to a situation in which a case becomes admissible when the national laws, “be they definitions of
crimes, general principles, or defences – define an area of responsibility markedly narrower than that
provided for in the Statute, allowing de facto impunity for acts punishable by the Court.”).
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that the State is not conducting the investigation genuinely, or that it has conducted a trial
only to shield the perpetrator or not “independently or impartially in accordance with the
norms of due process recognized by international law and [the trial was] conducted in a
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice” can the Court exert its own jurisdiction.52 A State which has not
passed implementing legislation is not thus an automatic target of an ICC admissibility
exception, but the possibility that the ICC could find the “ordinary crimes” prosecution
an exception to the ne bis in idem doctrine may still motivate States to strive for
compliance with the Rome Statute to the best of their abilities.
Final Judgment Rule
The final judgment rule is another doctrine of federal courts with a similar
underpinning. While exhaustion doctrine applies to habeas proceedings and is a
collateral attack on state convictions, the final judgment rule applies the same concept to
the broader area of Supreme Court appellate review of state court decisions. The final
judgment rule finds its statutory authority in 28 U.S.C. §1257, although the roots of
Supreme Court review goes further back.53
The general power of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions was
granted by Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Supreme Court, elaborating in
cases like Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee54 and Murdock v. City of Memphis,55 clarified the
nature of its appellate power. Among the reasons for allowing such review, the Supreme
Court pointed to the fact that “state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and
state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or
control, the regular administration of justice.…[I]n controversies between…a state and its
citizens…it enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies
heard, tried and determined before the national tribunals.…This is not all. A motive of
another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for state tribunals, might
induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is the importance,
and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon
all subjects within the purview of the constitution.”56 The ICC is faced with a similar
dilemma when dealing with States. Although the ICC is not an appellate court in relation
to national courts, it is in many ways the creation of the will of an international
community that wished to maintain some semblance of “uniformity” in the way the world
combats genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In that respect, the mandate
52

Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 20(3)(a)-(b).
§1291 also promotes the final judgment rule, but in the context of appeals from federal district courts to
courts of appeals. For purposes here, §1257 is more relevant because “appeals brought to the Supreme
Court under section 1257 involve the transmission of cases or issues between separate judicial
systems.…[it] implicates the relationship between the states and the federal government, and hence the
special concerns of federalism and comity.” Note, The Finality Rule for Supreme Court Review of State
Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1012 (1978) [hereinafter Finality Rule].
54
14 U.S. 304 (1816).
55
87 U.S. 590 (1875).
56
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 347. Notice particularly the assumption that the judicial power to
review encompassed controversies between “a state and its citizens” – in the realm of Rome Statute crimes,
a large number of the most difficult cases will inevitably involve governments turning on their own people,
such as in Serbia, Sudan, etc.
53
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of the Court may often involve seeing through the national prejudices and jealousies to
administer justice, although the ICC may not possess the power to actually do so.57
The very concerns that restrain the ICC from overreaching its jurisdiction into
areas of State sovereignty also appeared in Murdock. Recognizing the vast reach
appellate review would otherwise have over state court decisions, the Supreme Court
found, “It cannot, therefore, be maintained that it is in any case necessary for the security
of the rights claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that the
Supreme Court should examine and decide other questions not of a federal character.”58
This clever construction accomplishes the dual purpose of restraining the Supreme Court
from overreaching in its use of appellate power by deferring to states on issues of state
law, while cementing the right of the Supreme Court to review federal issues.
While the ICC does not have the luxury of distinguishing a clear set of
supranational laws from national laws via which it can precisely follow the rationales
underpinning Martin or Murdock, 59 it can, however, maintain a better sense of when to
defer by simply recognizing the very fact that it is situated differently than the Supreme
Court in Martin and Murdock. The lack of clarity surrounding the law the ICC is
supposed to be upholding and the fact that the ICC is prevented from deferring on the
basis of differences in law,60 means that, even more than the Supreme Court, the ICC
needs to see how States interpret the alleged conduct through their own proceedings
before it makes any decisions, a goal which can be serviced by application of a final
judgment rule theory.61
The final judgment rule is, like exhaustion doctrine in habeas cases, just another
manner of qualifying federal review to protect state proceedings from needless
interference.62 Whether for reasons of judicial efficiency, or comity and federalism,63
57

See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 46, at 11-14.
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. at 632-33.
59
Unlike the history and tradition upholding both federal and state law, the very existence of international
criminal law is ephemeral – it is an interstitial body of law in the space between international treaties and
conventions, domestic criminal codes, transnational crime, and, now increasingly, crimes of State. See
Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 9-24; M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS 15-21 (1997); Young, supra note 4, at p.___.
The ICC cannot easily call upon the principles of “international criminal law” to justify its need to
intervene. The Court’s mandate envisions its role in setting an international standard for international
criminal law. Iontcheva Turner, supra note 46, at 4. But the reality is that there is very little consensus
about precisely what law the ICC is even clarifying.
60
See supra note 50 for discussion on national prosecutions of “ordinary crimes” and the idea that
prosecution by a State on the basis of its national laws is not in and of itself sufficient to render the case
admissible for purposes of an ICC investigation.
61
Finality Rule, supra, note 53, at 1013-14 (“By facilitating the development of alternative grounds for the
disposition of cases, the rule of finality under section 1257 permits the Court to avoid unnecessary
decisionmaking.”).
62
Id. at 1006 (“The entire case approach – with its corresponding finality rule – rests in part upon the
supposition that efficiency is best served by restricting appellate interruptions of the trial process to an
absolute minimum. By preserving the integrity of the trial, the rule of finality under the entire case model
[as opposed to the ‘individual issue’ model] obviously facilitates continuity and results in a speedier
disposition of the case. The finality rule also finds support in considerations other than efficiency. The
interests of litigants in securing justice is served when controversies are resolved in the most expeditious
fashion consistent with preserving the requirements of due process. Significantly. from the standpoint of
fairness to the parties, the prohibition of interlocutory appeals prevents dilatory tactics by those litigants
58
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federal court deference to state courts in anticipation of a final judgment is mirrored in
the ICC relation to national courts. The Rome Statute attempts to limit the number of
appeals and challenges to admissibility rulings, yet its need to maintain flexibility allows
the Prosecutor a rolling basis on which to review admissibility decisions.64 For example,
if the ICC decided to defer to the Sudanese government because the case was
inadmissible in light of ongoing investigations, the Prosecutor could after six months, if
he felt there was new evidence or a change that rendered the case admissible, reopen
admissibility proceedings for Darfur. If, however, the Court were to adhere to a final
judgment type of doctrine by waiting until a final national judgment were rendered, the
Court could preserve its legitimacy and authority better because it would avoid a series of
reversals in admissibility decisions.
Abstention
Exhaustion of state remedies and the final judgment rule are just a few analogous
federal courts doctrine which might be applicable to justifying ICC deference. The
several abstention doctrines developed by federal courts outline different reasons why
federal courts are not to interfere with state proceedings. Unlike exhaustion doctrine, a
type of collateral attack which places the federal courts in a position of waiting for the
final state pronouncement, abstention is applicable when a motion for an injunction of the
state proceeding is filed in the federal court. In this light, exhaustion might be more
similar to the Court’s application of ne bis in idem which occurs after a national
proceeding, while abstention is closer to the Court’s role before or during an investigation
or prosecution. A closer examination of the Younger abstention doctrine clarifies the
similarities for ICC jurisdiction.
In the broad realm of state and federal concurrent jurisdiction, substantial overlap
has required the development of rules of engagement for federal courts.65 Abstention is a
judicially-developed type of limitation on federal court jurisdiction, the most relevant
type of which is the Younger abstention.66 Also known as equitable restraint, it can be
characterized as the “judicially created bar to federal court interference with ongoing
state proceedings.”67 Sprouting from the Supreme Court decision in Younger v. Harris

who can afford to subject their adversaries to attrition or who have an interest in delaying completion of the
trial.”). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1975).
63
Id. at 503-05 (J. Renhnquist, dissenting).
64
Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 18(3) (“The Prosecutor’s deferral to a State’s investigation shall be
open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a
significant change of circumstances based on the State’s unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out
the investigation.”); Article 19(10) (“If the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17,
the Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision when he or she is fully satisfied that new
facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under
article 17.”).
65
See Richard Fallon, Daniel Meltzer, and David Shapiro, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1144-48 (2003).
66
The Younger abstention is not precisely in the same category as the other abstentions such as Pullman,
Thibodaux or Burford. For purposes here, however, it will be considered a form of abstention. See Martin
Redish, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 281 (1990).
67
See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 796.
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and its companion cases,68 the doctrine of Younger abstention is premised on notions of
equity, comity and federalism.69 When a state court prosecution is pending, Younger
calls for federal courts to refrain from issuing injunctions, effectively giving deference to
state jurisdiction.70 Younger was a necessary creation after federal courts found
themselves flooded with filings seeking injunctions of state court proceedings following
Dombrowski v. Pfister, a case in which the Supreme Court allowed for a federal court
injunction of a state court proceeding.71 Although there is debate about the notion of
comity which Younger embraces,72 the idea works well in the ICC system, which lacks an
appellate or hierarchical structure.73
The overlap of ICC and national systems is precisely mirrored in the system
acknowledged by Younger and the application of federal abstention is a very useful
example for the ICC. If Darfur were to begin investigating or prosecuting in response to
the Security Council referral, according to the theory of exhaustion of state remedies, the
ICC should defer to Sudan’s proceedings and only after the conclusion of those
proceedings would the Court be eligible to review Darfur for admissibility. Under the
Younger abstention doctrine, however, the Court is justified in making a determination to
defer not because it must first defer to the national proceedings, but because it chooses to
leave the ongoing proceedings in the national courts. A crucial outcome with a Younger
abstention, however, is that the federal decision to not interfere with the state proceeding
irrevocably leaves federal issues to be adjudicated in the state proceedings.74 Although
68

Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
69
401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (Justice Black writing, “courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act
to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.…This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering
with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper
respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better
and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism.’”).
70
See Martha Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1163-65 (1974) (comparing and pointing out that, unlike the Pullman abstention
in which the presumption is for federal jurisdiction, Younger presumes state jurisdiction before it examines
for special circumstances).
71
380 U.S. 479 (1965). See Frank Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535, 606 (1970) (pointing out the flood of cases into federal
courts).
72
401 U.S. at 43-44 (noting that “this underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering
with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is,
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”).
See also, Fallon et al, eds., supra note 65, at 322-26 (citing the debate about the existence, or lack of, parity
between state and federal courts).
73
See Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 673 (noting that “delegations were mindful
that the ICC was not envisaged as an appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts.”).
74
Field, supra note 70, at 1164; Fallon et al, supra note 65, at 1227 (“In Younger cases…the federal court
dismisses the suit, and the underlying federal claims must typically be adjudicated in the context of a state
criminal case, subject only to Supreme Court review. As the Court later held in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90 (1980), the state court adjudication will have full res judicata effect in subsequent federal court
proceedings.”).
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the ICC is not bound by a strict doctrine, it should maintain an awareness that an
application of a Younger-type justification for a deferral to State jurisdiction leaves the
Court open to criticism if it later finds the State proceeding deficient in some way and
delves into issues already settled in the State proceedings.75
Exceptions
Each doctrine mentioned so far can be utilized by the Court to support its
decisions to defer to national proceedings. Their usefulness, however, is not limited to
their positive application since the Court will face less challenges for deferring to States
than when it attempts to confront a State with the determination that it is unwilling or
unable to such an extent that the ICC can intervene. The ICC can rely on any number of
justifications for why a case is not admissible76 with the real difficulty being how to
justify why a case is admissible. These federal courts doctrines are therefore most
valuable to the ICC’s complementarity scheme because they all include exceptions that
can be utilized in prescribing boundaries for the ICC’s vague standards for finding cases
admissible.77
Although the Rome Statute was intentionally written with flexible language that
would be acceptable to the greatest number of signatories,78 the resulting mix of objective
and subjective standards leaves the Court vulnerable.79 The complementarity regime
overall has an objective procedure which allows for challenges, notification, deference,
and ne bis in idem among other provisions. Yet the criteria at the heart of the
admissibility determinations in Article 17 are premised on subjective elements such as
“substantial collapse”80 of the national judicial system or “an intent to bring the person

75

This consideration is most relevant to a situation like Darfur in which the Security Council referral
balances the scale toward an ICC proceeding (some would say an investigation is mandatory, see Schabas,
supra note 5, at 123). If an ICC investigation is already proceeding, the Prosecutor would have to
affirmatively justify under Article 53(2) why he wishes to halt the investigation. Otherwise, for State Party
referrals or exercises of the proprio motu power, if the Court has deferred to a State proceeding under
Article 18(2), then under 18(3) the Prosecutor may review the State proceedings after six months or “at any
time when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State’s unwillingness or
inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.”
76
Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 53(1)(c). This gives the Prosecutor discretion to take into account “the
gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, [whether] there are nonetheless substantial reasons to
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. As Prof. Shapiro has pointed out with
regard to the federal system, the grant of jurisdiction does not impose an obligation to exercise of
jurisdiction at all times. See David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
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Keep in mind that in an application of most of these exceptions, the ICC (embodied as the ICC
Prosecutor) acts in a role analogous to that of criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs in state courts seeking
federal review. This role, in turn, is in many respects as a proxy for victims who are otherwise unable to
seek any vindication of their rights. See David Donat-Cattin, The Role of Victims in the ICC Proceedings,
in Flavia Lattanzi, ed., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 251
(1998); Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparation to Victims, in Lee, ed., supra note 5, at p.262.
78
See Sadat, supra note 51, at 119; Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 674
(discussing high degree of States’ sensitivity to proposed terms such as “ineffective,” “diligently,” and
“good faith” that resulted in the term “genuinely” in Article 17); El Zeidy, supra note 7, at 900.
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Holmes, Principle of Complementarity, supra note 6, at 75-76 (pointing out the subjective elements in all
the criteria for unwillingness as well as for the inability).
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Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 17(3).
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concerned to justice.”81 These subjective elements imply discretionary implementation
of the complementarity regime, a situation mirrored in federal courts law.
Federal courts law has similarly encountered the realization that its doctrines are
not entirely rigid and that there is sometimes a need to exercise discretion to make room
for circumstances justifying exceptions – the doctrines are within the jurisdictional reach
of the federal courts, but the jurisdictional grant does not abolish exceptions.82 Federal
courts address the discretionary nature of their doctrines by creating concomitant
doctrines of exceptions.
Exceptions to Exhaustion of State Remedies
Although exhaustion has been codified in 28 U.S. C. §2254, its roots as a
judicially created doctrine reveal the types of exceptions anticipated. The Supreme Court
from early on has presumed the exhaustion of state remedies but for “cases of exceptional
urgency.”83 When contemplating the types of situations that qualified as cases of
exceptional urgency, the Supreme Court in U.S. ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler pointed to two
cases involving “interferences by the state authorities with the operations of departments
of the general government, and the other concerned the delicate relations of that
government with a foreign nation.”84 The Supreme Court has accepted as part of the
exhaustion doctrine that only rare cases of peculiar urgency justify interference in state
courts,85 but these are situations that can be analogized to ICC findings of admissibility.
According to Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, exceptions to the presumption of
inadmissibility must meet the standard of unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute
genuinely. Although standards for unwilling and unable are spelled out in 17(2)-(3), they
do not clearly specify what might qualify as “shielding,” “an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice,” and “total or substantial collapse.” But looking at cases justifying
exceptions to exhaustion provide may provide some useful considerations.86 For
example, In re Neagle,87 In re Loney,88 and Hunter v. Wood89 are cases in which
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine were granted because the state proceedings were
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Id., Art. 17(2)(b).
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 76, at 545, 574 (“Those who espouse the obligation
theory of federal jurisdiction frequently overlook or understate the range of situations in which the theory
simply does not accord with the facts.…[A]s experience and tradition teach, the question whether a court
must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible to answer in
gross.…Moreover, questions of jurisdiction are of special concern to the courts because they intimately
affect the courts’ relations with each other as well as with the other branches of government. Therefore, the
continued existence of measured authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects, the
principle of separation of powers.”).
83
269 U.S. at 18.
84
Id. at 19.
85
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1944).
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See Larry Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to
First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L. J. 393 (1983) (providing a look at the historic development of the
exhaustion doctrine).
87
135 U.S. 1 (1890) (concerning a deputy marshal discharged on habeas from state custody for murdering
an assailant in the performance of his duty to protect a justice of the court).
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134 U.S. 372 (1890) (concerning petitioner discharged on grounds that state prosecution would impede
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209 U.S. 205 (1908).
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seen as impairing some aspect of federal governance. Similarly, Wildenhus’ Case90
treats interference with federal government treaty rights. These cases are probably most
analogous to any charges of shielding which the ICC may want to bring against States.
Although the fact pattern in the U.S. cases may be completely opposite any situations
faced by the ICC (eg. In re Neagle concerns a state wishing to prosecute while the federal
government is looking to pardon), the underlying theory for these situations is the
dominant or overriding federal interest. The ICC as charged with its mandate to “put an
end to impunity…and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”91 can claim an
exception if the State’s behavior goes so far as to interfere with aspects of the Court’s
ability to attain those goals.
Another class of exceptions to exhaustion doctrine consists of cases “where the
state remedy is seriously inadequate.”92 This exception is analogous to some situations in
which the ICC is not able to point easily to shielding or an intent to avoid justice. In
Moore v. Dempsey, the Court did not require exhaustion of state remedies if “the whole
proceeding is a mask – that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrongs,
neither perfection in the machinery nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw
no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.”93 Similarly, Mooney v. Holohan,
although it ultimately denied federal habeas on the grounds that a “corrective judicial
process” was available at the state level, found that deprivation of due process via
contrivances such as perjury or intimidation was unacceptable and ultimately required
correction.94
The ICC may find itself similarly situated in that national proceedings may put on
the appearance of following due process or standard procedures, yet amount to a sham in
reality. The cases of Moore, Mooney and Ex parte Hawk give some of the reasoning that
can be used in justifying admissibility for such a case. Moore provides an outline of a
state proceeding that may be affected by public perceptions or pressures. As applied to
the ICC in Darfur, imagine that the Sudanese government conducts its own proceedings
and proceeds to acquit several alleged perpetrators. If the ICC were to find that the
judges or jury (if applicable) were daily critiqued in the newspapers or that there were
90

120 U.S. 1 (1887) (concerning a Belgian sailor who was discharged from state custody because the arrest
was contrary to an international treaty).
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Rome Statute, supra note 11, Preamble para. 5.
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Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 692 (1948) (J. Reed, dissenting). See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. at 118 (“But
where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal
contentions raised…a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be
remediless.”).
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261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923).
94
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (“We deem it sufficient for the present purpose to say that we are unable to
approve this narrow view of the requirement of due process. That requirement, in safeguarding the liberty
of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state, embodies the fundamental conceptions of
justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.…It is a requirement that cannot be
deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense
of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a
state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”).
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frequent demonstrations in the streets calling for acquittal of the defendants, the Court
might not be able to find that the national procedures were on their face unwilling or
unable or that there was an intentional shielding or obstruction of justice. Yet the reality
may be that the national proceedings are unable to protect the validity of the outcome in
light of external pressures such that the proceedings are clearly unjust. The ICC might
thus be able to apply the Moore reasoning under Article 17(3) by attributing such external
interference to a “substantial collapse or unavailability” of the national judiciary.
Mooney, on the other hand, points to a federal understanding of what qualifies as
due process as the standard by which the state courts must obey. In the ICC context, due
process and other disembodied legal principles that are not uniformly accepted are
extremely difficult to account for in any admissibility review. Because each State has its
own national legal system which the ICC must respect and balance against the
international community’s standards of justice, the ICC will always have a difficult time
pinning any admissibility exceptions on national procedural deficiencies.95 Concerns
with this unsettled aspect of the ICC’s jurisdictional reach has already driven some
countries to not ratify the treaty.96 Wielding a justification like Mooney provides,
however, may drive other countries closer to informal compliance.97 But mostly Mooney
will be helpful for situations that are in the middle between total compliance and
complete rejection of any international standards to which the ICC subscribes (eg.
torture) – where the State has exercised its jurisdiction but on “narrower grounds than
contemplated by the Statute…allowing de facto impunity for acts punishable by the
Court.”98 For example, the law in Sudan is a mixture of customary law, Islamic shari’a
law and democratic law in an infant state.99 Due process may be largely absent without
minimal protections such as a defendant’s right to counsel.100 If the Sudanese
government were to prosecute and acquit an alleged genocide perpetrator through its
normal process utilizing Sudanese judges and courts, the ICC on review would likely find
problems in the judicial process leading to an unjust result despite the procedural
perfection. The ICC may have a difficult task pronouncing the subtleties of the Sudanese
system to be outright corruption as opposed to part of its customary law heritage. So how
does the Court tactfully avoid passing judgment on the intact judiciary of a country that
does not confess to a total or even substantially collapsed judicial system? The Court
cannot make admissibility decisions on the basis of outcomes in a way that effectively
pushes States to litigate toward a certain end, and yet it cannot state that the intact judicial
system of one nation does not administer justice in a way that is equal to the way another
95
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within the purview of ICC jurisdiction. See Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of
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nation does. Following the Mooney approach effectively upholds the presumption of
deference to national proceedings while making it known that the national proceedings,
though not inferior or lacking, may have made an error in the particular instance
requiring a “corrective judicial process to remedy the wrong.”101 The advantage of the
Mooney format is thus when a State brings a case within its normal parameters, which
may be narrower grounds than the Court ultimately requires such that a patently unjust
result occurs, the Court experiences no need to pronounce the national government as
unable according to Article 17(3), but can say the State is unwilling if it does not provide
the “corrective judicial process.”
The exceptions to habeas exhaustion doctrine have been codified in 28 U.S.C.
§2254(b) as well. In relevant part, §2254 reads: “An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not
be granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process;
or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.” The Supreme Court has read this to mean that an exception to exhaustion will
be made “only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective
process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.”102 An
example of this was Wilwording v. Swenson, a case in which the Supreme Court allowed
an exception to the exhaustion doctrine because the state court had never granted a
hearing on the issues being litigated in the instant case in other similar cases – the
existence of corrective proceedings was therefore meaningless.103
As applied to the ICC, exception (B)(i) could be made analogous to an unable
claim under Article 17(2) while exception (B)(ii) would be analogous to unwilling
according to Article 17(3), although Wilwording and Duckworth lead to the belief that the
two categories can actually be collapsed into one if the national proceedings, though
available, are so egregious that they become equivalent to an absence of further
corrective proceedings. Applying the exceptions under §2254 in this way thus takes the
ICC one step further towards an admissibility finding by declaring whatever national
remedies exist will be insufficient to fulfill the Rome Statute’s definition. In defining
those standards, the ICC could look to the reasoning given in Wilwording – the complete
absence in the state’s history of ever proceeding in the way the Supreme Court
considered corrective. Similarly, if the national court of Sudan claimed that it had an
appeal process but had never in its history actually completed an appeal, that would
provide the ICC with enough reason to find admissibility grounds in the same way the
Supreme Court did in Wilwording. Part of this analysis is thus comparison to the State’s
previous practices in order to determine if the State exhibits a pattern of such behavior.104
Exceptions to Final Judgment Rule
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As codified in 28 U.S.C. §1257, the final judgment rule provides, “Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could
be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari….” Controversy
over what constitutes a final judgment105 or what it means to be the highest court in
which a decision can be made106 has rendered the final judgment rule subject to many
exceptions. The most coherent treatment of the nature of exceptions to the finality rule
came in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.107 Coming after a string of cases in which
exceptions for non-final cases were made,108 Cox attempted to sort the types of cases
justifying exceptions into four broad categories.
The four categories are generally further divided into two groups: the first two
types of exceptions pertain to cases in which the federal issue survives further
proceedings, and the second two classes of exceptions relate to cases in which the federal
issue may be mooted but review is nonetheless justified. The first two are perceived as
reasonable and practical exceptions in light of the finality rule, while the second two are
seen as an expansive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s power to override the final
judgment rule.109 In the ICC context, however, the exceptions are not divided in the same
way because realistically, there is no clear ICC law that can be distinguished from
national laws such that survival of an ICC issue is ever a real basis for intervening in a
State process. The ICC is evaluating for issues of unwillingness or inability according to
Article 17(2)-(3), so the relevant comparison is about how the finality exceptions can
help define the State’s unwillingness or inability. For the most part, though, these
exceptions may be more useful for borderline cases that are more diplomatically handled
under Article 17(3)’s inability standard where there is no indication of a State’s blatant
unwillingness through shielding or impartial proceedings, situations which would surely
generate other more obvious evidence allowing admissibility.
In the first category are “those cases in which there are further proceedings – even
entire trials – yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or another the
federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained. In these
circumstances, because the case is for all practical purposes concluded, the judgment of
the state court on the federal issue is deemed final..”110 This class of cases might be
considered relatives of the second class of exceptions under §2254(b) in which the
existence of a corrective process is irrelevant because the process is, “as a practical
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matter,”111 concluded. This typically involves a case in which there is no further defense
based on state law and the state has already ruled against any defense based on a federal
issue. In the federal context, these types of cases are most important when there is a
constitutional right which risks being diminished by further delay. In the ICC context,
however, since there are no analogous supranational rights to vindicate, this type of
exception is probably most comparable to cases of procedural rulings resulting in
procedural limitations.112 For example, if the courts in Sudan had a process in which a
lower judge ruled that crucial testimony of certain witnesses, without which acquittal
would be guaranteed, could not be taken and this kind of ruling would be carried through
all further national proceedings, the Court might look at that as a case in which, for all
practical purposes, the national proceedings were final. The implication toward the State
would be that, of several options available, it chose the worst one that now prevents
further proceedings from being meaningful. Such a ruling would not necessarily imply
an intent on the part of the government to shield or prevent justice, although it might be
very likely, so this scenario might be perceived as placing the ICC in the uncomfortable
position of passing judgment on the validity of a national proceeding. But by limiting the
finality exception to just one issue (eg. the ruling in the particular case regarding
admission of testimony) and framing it as a choice the State made although it had other
options, the ICC might be able to avoid the accusation that it is passing judgment on an
entire national system while still being able to contend that, on that one issue, because of
“unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain…the necessary
evidence and testimony.”113 The ICC can thus make the argument, if not under
unwillingness standards, then under the unavailability standard of Article 17(3).
The second category of Cox exceptions involve cases “in which the federal issue,
finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision
regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.”114 As examples of this
category, the Cox court pointed to Brady v. Maryland115 and Radio State WOW, Inc. v.
Johnson,116 and the recent case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.117 also fits this
category. Applied to the ICC, this category is very difficult to analogize because of the
inability of the ICC to recognize Rome Statute crimes as more legitimate than “ordinary
crimes” in national laws – although the ICC has specified certain conduct as genocide or
crimes against humanity, the same conduct can be tried by a national judiciary as an
ordinary crime that may not carry the same sentencing or consequences as a Rome
111
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Statute crime. This category of exceptions basically requires a decision by the ICC that
no matter what the State does, it will leave an issue unresolved which will require the
ICC’s intervention. Even more strongly than the first category, this type of exception
requires the Court to make a judgment about the capability of the national courts to fully
handle a prosecution. A hypothetical case would consist of the highest Sudanese court
remanding a murder case to a lower court for further proceedings only on a perjury issue.
If the ICC felt that the further State proceedings would not affect the acquittal on the
murder charges, it would still have trouble justifying intervention on those grounds. The
ICC would have trouble proving admissibility on a State’s final judgment, much less
justifying interference as an exception to the final judgment rule – intervening because
the Court feels the acquittal was the wrong decision would be very difficult to defend.
Although the first category of Cox exceptions does tend to characterize the State’s further
proceedings as mere formality, it leaves open the possibility that the national system is
still valid but merely unable to reach the needed result in this particular instance. This
second category, however, requires a more blatant characterization of the State’s system
as wrong or inadequate to prosecute Rome Statute types of crimes altogether, a depiction
the ICC would be wise not to adopt.
Cox’s third category includes “those situations where the federal claim has been
finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in
which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of
the case.”118 Citing California v. Stewart119 and North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy
v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc.,120 Cox allows for federal interference before a final state
judgment when the federal issue will be permanently lost if the case proceeds in state
courts. In the context of the ICC in Sudan, this might translate into a case in which
Sudan is attempting to prosecute a defendant for genocide based on Rome Statute
guidelines, but in the course of its proceedings, makes a ruling that certain evidence of
mass sterilization cannot be collected. If the case for genocide proceeded in the national
system on some other grounds, the ICC may never have a chance to prosecute the alleged
conduct of mass sterilization and the perpetrators may never be tried for that particular
conduct at all. This third category of exceptions can thus be characterized as allowing the
ICC to intervene when State procedural barriers prevent proceedings on issues relevant to
the ICC’s realm of interest, and while ICC intervention will undoubtedly stir debate, it is
likely less than if it claimed a right to intervene over an area of substantive State law.121
The ICC in this exception creates a bubble for itself if it uses this type of exception to
preserve issues relevant to the Court, and if it does so by pointing to a deficiency in the
state’s procedural process. This would qualify under Article 17(3) as an inability on the
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part of the State, while not imputing to the State an intentional shielding or intent to avoid
justice.
The last Cox category of exceptions is by far the most confusing. In its distilled
form, “interlocutory review is permitted (1) when ‘reversal of the state court on the
federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action,’
and (2) when failure to consider the state court decision immediately ‘might seriously
erode federal policy.’”122 The Cox opinion cites Curry, Langdeau, and Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo123as the cases most reflective of this category of exception.
This class is very similar to the third category except that in that category, the Supreme
Court intervenes because it is the only certain time at which it might be able to review the
issue. The fourth category, however, includes exceptions for when review might be had
later as well.124 This characteristic tends to shift category four exceptions toward an
“individual issue model” in which the Supreme Court chooses to review independent
issues that it deems important to federal interests.125 Although the ICC may find this type
of exception useful, it needs to be careful that reviewing a State proceeding mostly
because it serves an important ICC interest may come too close to creating an unwelcome
hierarchy. While the other three categories of exceptions to finality doctrine rely on
circumstances in which the ICC may step in because the State is proving unwilling or
unable, this category seems to indicate situations in which the Court is even admitting
that the State may still be willing or able. This exception within the federal-state system
is already tenuous,126 but applied to the ICC-State system in which the supranationalnational law distinction is not very clear, this exception is probably unfeasible.
Exceptions to Abstention Doctrine
Abstention is an exercise of judicial restraint when all “jurisdictional and
justiciabilty requirements are met.”127 Although there are different theories as to how or
why the federal courts should issue injunctions,128 the allowance for judicial restraint in
light of state proceedings has been strongly imbued in the federal judicial system.129
Exceptions to this presumption of deference must therefore battle an overarching
systemic goal of promoting the interests of comity and federalism. Naturally, the few
circumstances that can justify a breach of the deference presumption are extreme
situations. Transferred into the ICC context, these are situations more relevant to a
finding of unwillingness under Article 17(2), as opposed to inability under Article 17(3).
Additionally, because the ICC does not have the ability to actually enjoin State
proceedings, the equivalent of an injunction or declaratory relief would be determination
that a case fulfills the Rome Statute’s admissibility requirements. Lastly, the situations
that qualify as exceptions under an abstention theory, unlike the exceptions to the final
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judgment rule, are not borderline instances of State mishandling which may involve
merely inability without negative intent – rather, these are examples of clear State
misconduct embodying a high level of intentional misconduct.
The Supreme Court in Younger imagined that abstention would apply in all cases
except for “exceptional circumstances” in which case the federal courts could exercise
their jurisdiction.130 This reasoning closely tracks the explanation given in exhaustion
doctrine, which cites “circumstances of peculiar urgency” as the only exceptions to the
presumption of deference to states.131 The emphasis on how extreme these situations
need to be mirrors the presumption which the Rome Statute places on the Court – that a
case is considered inadmissible unless the Court can prove one of the situations justifying
an exception.
Bad faith state prosecutions constitute the first type of exception recognized by
the court in Younger.132 The embodiment of this exception was given by the example of
Dombrowski v. Pfister, a case in which the state prosecutors utilized the courts for the
purpose of harassing and intimidating civil rights activists as “part of a plan to employ
arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants
and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the
constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana.”133 In distinguishing Younger from
Dombrowski, the Supreme Court noted that Dombrowski did “sufficiently establish the
kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single
prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered the very restricted
circumstances under which an injunction could be justified.”134 The Supreme Court
further elaborated, however, that “even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is ‘both
great and immediate.’”135 Although Younger itself did not qualify for an exception as a
bad faith prosecution and no case since then has qualified for such an exception,
theoretically a case of bad faith prosecution resulting in great and immediate irreparable
injury would qualify.
In a scenario involving the ICC, a bad faith prosecution on the part of the State
would not be a case of harassment, but rather of excessive leniency for the defendant(s).
The Court would not be aligned with the interests of parties who are being harassed, but
rather with hypothetical petitioners (eg. victims) asking for an injunction of the national
proceedings based on claims of irreparable injury. Such a showing would fulfill the
Article 17(2) definition of unwillingness because it would be a prosecution brought to
shield a defendant, or unjustifiably delay or conduct an impartial hearing with an intent to
avoid bringing the defendant to justice.136 The usefulness of the Dombrowski example is
that it specifies what level of injury from the bad faith prosecution is needed to justify
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intervention since the Rome Statute itself is vague as to any methods of measurement (eg.
what qualifies as shielding). In an ICC application of the rationale, the burden placed on
the appellants in Dombrowski to prove their allegations of irreparable injury transfers to
the ICC such that it must prove great and immediate irreparable injury. Of course, the
injury in an ICC case is not to the defendants who are benefiting from the leniency of the
national courts. The Court will have to act as a proxy for a combination of victims’
interests and the interest of the international community in order to show some type of
injury resulting from the State’s bad faith prosecution.137 Particularly in the case of
Darfur, the Security Council referral expressed the very specific wishes of the entire
international community embodied in the UN,138 such that claiming an injury to the
expressed interests of at least the international community, if not the victims of the
alleged crimes, should not be difficult to fathom.
How to show an injury, however, is not readily apparent when there is a lack of a
real petitioner. The Court’s representation of hypothetical interests would still need to
rely on proof of an irreparable injury to someone. For example, if the Sudanese
prosecution were conducted in bad faith, the ICC could allege a “great and immediate”
irreparable injury to 1) the claims of victims who may lose their chance to press charges
against the perpetrators, 2) victims who are continuing to suffer at the hands of janjaweed
militia due to a lack of good faith prosecution, and/or 3) the international community’s
ability to prevent Rome Statute crimes from occurring or to secure good faith trials
through its referral process. The scope of the harm would need to be proven the way the
appellants in Dombrowski “had offered to prove that their offices had been raided and all
their files and records seized pursuant to search and arrest warrants that were later
summarily vacated by a state judge for lack of probable cause. They also offered to
prove that despite the state court order quashing the warrants and suppressing the
evidence seized, the prosecutor was continuing to threaten to initiate new prosecutions of
appellants under the same statutes, was holding public hearings at which photostatic
copies of the illegally seized documents were being used, and was threatening to use
other copies of the illegally seized documents to obtain grand jury indictments against the
appellants on charges of violating the same statutes.”139 These types of allegations
transferred to an ICC context might translate into repeated summary judgments
dismissing consecutive claims against the defendant, continuing use of perjured
testimony, ongoing threats of prosecution aimed at witnesses or victims, and other acts
indicating perpetual violation of the victims’ and international community’s interest in a
good faith prosecution. Framing the unwillingness standards in the Dombrowski manner,
as an exception to normal abstention doctrine, enables the Court to utilize vocabulary
such as irreparable injury, and add dimensions such as “great and immediate,” to fill in
the blanks left by Article 17(2).
Another fruitful manner of applying the Younger bad faith exception is by
examining which cases the Supreme Court designated as falling short of the Dombrowski
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level of bad faith. Since the federal courts have not granted a single bad faith exception
post-Younger, the body of non-qualifying cases proves more relevant to defining which
cases may qualify.140 For example, in Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court refused to
find bad faith or harassment through repeated seizures of the movie “Deep Throat”
because the actions were conducted according to authorizing judicial orders.141 This
hints at the idea that proof of the bad faith has to run from top to bottom, showing an
intention to harass at every level. This is similar to Juidice v. Vail, another case in which
the Supreme Court found that the lack of bad faith on the part of the judges issuing the
orders nullified the allegations of bad faith that would allow for an exception.142 The ICC
might thereby want to focus, in addition to the overall nature of the prosecution, on
alleging and proving bad faith on the part of the judges’ or judiciary bodies’ intent to
enforce judicial orders “motivated by desire to harass or…conducted in bad faith.”143
Younger’s second category of exception to abstention doctrine is for statutes that
“might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it.”144 This class of exceptions may be almost extinct in federal
courts today after Trainor v. Hernandez, in which the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court finding that a state statute was violative of the due process clause without clarifying
whether an unconstitutional statute would still justify an exception to abstention.145 The
ICC, however, need only explore whether the original reasoning behind this exception is
applicable to the Court’s burden of proving unwillingness. A comparable case in the
Darfur scenario would be if Sudan passed a statute which declared all defendants charged
with crimes prior to April 2, 2005 (the date on which the Security Council referred Darfur
to the ICC) either immune or pardoned. Discussions about the nature of amnesties or
pardons in relation to admissibility generally tend to recognize the admissibility of cases
in which amnesty was doled out either during a proceeding or as the conclusion of a
proceeding, but recognize the limitation of the Rome Statute in reaching instances of
amnesties or pardons post-conviction.146 Based on Article 17, the assumption is that
amnesties granted during the course of a proceeding automatically qualifies the trial as a
“sham trial.”147 The Younger exception rationale can bolster this presumption by
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pinpointing any specific legislation authorizing blanket amnesties or immunities and
providing supplemental support for its dismissal.148 For cases of post-conviction
measures, the Younger exception could become useful if it was able to indicate a piece of
legislation rendering a broad swath of immunity or pardons such that compared to prior
patterns of legislative enactment pursuant to a judgment, the new statute indicates blatant
disregard for the standards exacted in the Rome Statute. As such, this Younger exception
provides another basis on which to compare national proceedings against their own
histories, even if, in the end, the rarity of amnesties or pardons through statutory means
will render this exception minimally useful.
The third Younger exception includes a few sub-topics encompassed in the
broader category of situations in which the state lacks an adequate forum to adjudicate
the issue. The reason can be bias or a finding that the state courts fail to offer an
adequate remedy.149 Younger does not seem to explicitly lay out the boundaries of this
third exception such that the confirmation of the exception’s existence consists of the
subsequent cases which presume the exception, yet the inadequate state forum exception
is the most substantial of the exceptions stemming from Younger.150 Gibson v. Berryhill
was one of the earliest cases to utilize this third exception.151 In Gibson, the plaintiffs
complained that the Alabama Board of Optometry suffered from an incurable bias that
prevented it from providing them with a “fair and impartial hearing in conformity with
due process of law.”152 The Supreme Court agreed that the state proceedings were biased
based on the fact that “those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings
should not adjudicate these disputes,” and possibly also because the Board may have a
prejudicial notion against the plaintiffs already.153 The federal branch’s willingness to
intervene, however, is circumscribed somewhat by Kugler v. Helfant, a case in which the
state rules allowing for judicial recusal was a sufficient safeguard against system-wide
bias such that it was not shown that the overall state court system could not provide an
unbiased process.154
Transplanted into the ICC context, the Gibson rationale requires a showing by the
Court that the national proceedings suffer from a bias (such as substantial pecuniary gain)
so severe that it pervades the whole system, or that the ruling parties in the proceedings
had previously engaged in behavior indicative of their predetermined disposition (such as
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an attorney who formerly defended the defendant sitting as a judge). The Court in
making the case for a showing of unwillingness thus needs to focus both on showing that
the national system overall does not have sufficient safeguards to guarantee an unbiased
system, not just one or two unbiased judges, and on proving that the judges or
administering bodies have substantial stakes in the outcome of the case.
The second aspect of the inadequate state forum exception is based on whether
the state proceeding is able to provide a remedy. The Supreme Court addressed this in
Gerstein v. Pugh, a case in which the federal courts, referring only briefly to Younger,
held that “relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in
state prosecutions.…The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but
only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not
be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings
could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.”155 This reading of the
exception recalls the second class of exceptions under the final judgment rule – the
survival of an important federal interest which the state has no way of adequately
addressing. As in that context, the application of this rationale to an ICC situation is
tricky because the lack of a state remedy is not clearly grounds for intervention. For
example, Sudan has a provision allowing use of force to resist an illegal warrant for
arrest.156 If a defendant killed many people but claimed this provision as a defense and
the State found the claim reasonable, the ICC may find itself unable to point to any
unwillingness or inability other than the fact that the national law is different than the
Rome Statute. Unless the state provisions are in some way applied with bias or in such a
way as to cause great irreparable injury, the usefulness of the Gerstein manner of
evaluation may not prove very useful for the ICC.
The lack of an adequate state remedy is, however, different from the complete
absence of a state proceeding. Although this is not strictly an exception to abstention
doctrine, the Supreme Court was quick to point out that Younger abstention principles are
not applicable to a situation in which the state is not conducting proceedings. In Steffel v.
Thompson, the Supreme Court specifically found, “When no state criminal proceeding is
pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, considerations of equity, comity, and
federalism on which Younger v. Harris, and Samuels v. Mackell…were based, have little
vitality: federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption
of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional
principles.”157 Effectively stripping the federal courts of any need to justify federal
action, the Steffel rationale applied to the ICC is similar to one of the initial
complementarity propositions – that the ICC faces no obstacle in an “inaction
scenario.”158 As discussed earlier, once a State decides to initiate its own proceedings,
the ICC will in almost every situation need to defer to the State proceedings unless or
until the Court can prove an exception to the inadmissibility presumption. Steffel is
simply another theory to bolster the Court’s initial right to intervene.
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Another tangent of exceptions to Younger abstention is the fact that a state may
waive its right to argue for the application of abstention principles and thereby
voluntarily submit to a federal forum. The Supreme Court found in Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services v. Hodory, “If the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal
forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back into
the State’s own system.”159 Similarly, the majority of the ICC’s jurisdiction is built on a
foundation of State consent.160 Under Article 13(a) and (c) respectively, the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction if the situation is referred by a State Party (that possesses
jurisdiction over the matter initially) or if the Prosecutor uses his proprio motu powers.
Both of these scenarios require the State’s acceptance of the Court’s exercise of
jurisdiction161 and are therefore theoretically analogous to voluntary waivers of Younger
abstention. The voluntary waiver, however, can be used not only to allow federal court
proceedings, but even to urge the federal system to take over the case.162 In drafting the
Rome Statute, nobody contemplated that States would so willingly refer cases to the
Court because State sovereignty interests were so high.163 The worry now is that national
courts, in referring their cases voluntarily, will actually be doing so to the detriment of
the underlying principles of complementarity. The presumption of deference to State
proceedings underscores the intention of the Rome Statute to create a system in which
States do not shirk their duty to prosecute the core crimes.164 The Court’s continued
acceptance of self-referral cases waiving complementarity, while necessary if the need
for investigation and prosecution exists, may undercut the effectiveness of national
regimes. The ICC must be aware of the likelihood that States may take advantage of the
fact that they can waive their primary jurisdiction and proceed to a “‘selective or
asymmetrical self-referral’ where the de jure government is itself party to an internal
armed conflict.”165 In such a situation, the Court needs to be aware of the politics at stake
and adhere to its duty to investigate entire situations, as opposed to just specific cases.166
State waivers in favor of the ICC forum are thus both an easement of the Court’s duty to
abide by a Younger-type abstention, but it can also cause the Court difficulty in
maintaining its independence and the viability of the complementarity regime.
Another interesting aspect to the issue of waivers and referrals is a referral to the
ICC according to Article 13(b) by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. As seen in the Darfur referral, Sudan is not a State Party and is
not voluntarily waiving the complementarity principle. The extent to which a state may
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involuntarily waive the Younger abstention doctrine is also an issue that plagues the
federal courts. The federal courts have decided that states can actually involuntarily
waive the Younger abstention principles and that federal courts may consider the
abstention doctrine sua sponte.167 In the ICC realm, these concerns are slightly different
because the Court has an obligation under Article 53(1)(b) to consider admissibility
issues such that considering admissibility sua sponte is already assumed. The issue of
whether States may involuntarily waive into an ICC proceeding, however, is more of a
political and practical issue than a jurisdictional issue.168 The Rome Statute confers the
ICC with jurisdiction, but investigating, prosecuting and enforcing a judgment without
any cooperation from the State would be difficult, if not impossible. The Security
Council referral, by virtue of it extending from the UN and with it the UN’s own powers,
endows the ICC only with an additional ally and resource, but it does not extend the
Court’s jurisdiction beyond what Article 13(b) allows.169 Involuntary waiver in the ICC
sense thus only arises in the context of a Security Council referral and results in more
reliance on the UN’s capabilities to coerce cooperation than in the ICC’s ability to
impose its jurisdiction.
Possible Future Grounds for ICC Admissibility Exceptions
There are several additional theories of federal courts doctrine that may also be
relevant to the ICC structure, but which will only be touched on briefly here. The notion
of independent and adequate state grounds as justification for federal deference to state
decisions provides another fruitful area for comparison with ICC admissibility
proceedings. The basic proposition of the independent and adequate doctrine comes from
the idea that if the decision of the highest state court rests on grounds that are
independent of the federal grounds and the state grounds are adequate to support the
decision, then the federal court should not review even the federal issue.170 To be
independent, the state ground “must not be intertwined with or dependent upon a federal
question either explicitly or implicitly.”171 To be considered adequate, “A decision based
on state law…would necessarily be affirmed even if any decision on federal law were
reversed.”172 These grounds for independent and adequate in an ICC context, however,
might be “lost in translation” because of the difference between the nationalsupranational relationship and the state-federal relationship. The lack of distinct
167

Stagner, supra note 150, at 177.
Sadat and Carden, supra note 1, at 414-15 (“Complementarity has a substantive component, a
procedural component, and a component that we will call ‘political,’ or ‘prudential’ for lack of a better
term.…The prudential aspect refers to the policy choices made in deciding what kinds of cases should be in
the ICC, rather than national courts, which, as noted above, means that some cases that are clearly within
the Court’s jurisdiction (prescriptively) will not be heard by the Court.”). See also, Kenneth Abbott, Robert
Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik et al, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 401
(2000) (noting the increasing tendency to make political decisions through legal institutions).
169
Condorelli and Villalplando, supra note 138, at 571.
170
See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 686.
171
Thomas Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism
Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799 (1985) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) and
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940)).
172
Richard Matasar and Gregory Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and
Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1292
fn. 2 (1986) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)).
168

29

supranational grounds as opposed to the national grounds currently seems to imply that
all national grounds are independent and adequate for whatever decision the State makes.
Eventually, however, the ICC may need to delve further into how it will cope with
the gap between national proceedings on the ordinary crimes basis and proceedings
utilizing the Rome Statute language. Finding the ordinary crimes proceedings to not be
independent or adequate in relation to the supranational law might be just one method of
distinguishing them from Rome Statute standards such that the ICC can intervene an
unwilling or unable finding.173 Solidifying such a stance will require, more or less, a
presumption that States should implement legislation incorporating the core crimes into
their national laws or else suffer a finding that their ordinary crime laws are inadequate or
not independent of Rome Statute issues.174
Conclusion
The complementarity regime serves as the gatekeeper for any investigations and
prosecutions the ICC may be facing. Complementarity’s most interesting feature,
however, is its dual role as both a guard that keeps the Court’s jurisdiction from reaching
beyond its mandate and as an usher that sweeps cases into the ICC’s jurisdiction when
States shirk their duties. The admissibility requirement based on a showing of State
unwillingness or inability is the aperture through which all proceedings must pass.
The complementarity regime also highlights the difficult nature of the
supranational-national relationship and focuses the Court’s limitations in a way that
accommodates comparison with the federal-state relationship. Through these doctrines
of exhaustion, finality, and abstention, the Court is able to take a glimpse at what its
future might entail. Any suggestions for what the Court might attempt to accomplish
with referrals such as Darfur may stem from the comparison.
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